KIMEL v. FLORIDA BD. OF REGENTS
120 S. CT. 631 (2000)

SUPREME COURT RULES THAT STATES ARE NOT IMMUNE
FROM AGE DISCRIMINATION SUITS
I. FAaTS
In December of 1994, two associate professors instituted a suit
against their state employer in a federal district court,1 alleging
violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA") of
1967.2 The professors, aged 57 and 58, alleged that the University
discriminated against them on the basis of age and retaliated against
them for having previously filed charges of discrimination with the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, and alleged that the
University's evaluation system had a disparate impact on older faculty
members.3 The University filed a motion to dismiss on the ground
that the federal district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction as the
University was immune from suits brought under the ADEA by virtue
of the Eleventh Amendment.! The federal district court granted the
motion to dismiss and held that Congress demonstrated a clear intent
to abrogate states' immunity to suit under the Eleventh Amendment;
however, the ADEA was not enacted or extended pursuant to
Congress' enforcement power under the Fourteenth Amendment
and thus, did not abrogate the states' Eleventh Amendment
immunity.'
In April of 1995, several on-staff and former faculty members and
librarians of two state universities, all of whom were over the age of
40, instituted a suit against the Florida Board of Regents in a federal
district court.6 The Plaintiffs alleged that the Board's refusal to
1. Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 120 S. Ct. 631, 638 (2000) (seeking declaratory and
injunctive relief, along with backpay, promotions, and compensatory and punitive damages).
2. 81 Stat. 602, as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq. (1994 ed. & Supp. III).
3. SeeKimen 120S. Ct. at638 (2000).
4. Id.

5. Id.
6. See id. (requesting the court to grant backpay, liquidated damages, and permanent
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enforce a prior agreement in which the salaries of qualifying
university employees were to be allocated funds to reflect adjustments
in the market, violated the ADEA and a Florida statute as it effected a
disparate impact on the base pay of older employees who had worked
the longest for the universities.7
In May of 1996, another state employee instituted a suit against his
Florida state employer in federal district court." The employee
alleged failure to promote on the basis of age and retaliation for
having previously filed grievances of age discrimination.9
In both of these cases, the state employer filed a motion to dismiss
the suit based on its Eleventh Amendment immunity from suits
brought by private individuals." The federal district courts denied
the motions and held that under the ADEA, Congress expressed a
clear intent to abrogate the states' Eleventh Amendment immunity
and that Congress was authorized under § 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment to enact or extend the ADEA."
All three cases were appealed to the Eleventh Circuit.12 The United
States intervened to support its position that the ADEA abrogated the
5
states' Eleventh Amendment immunity."
The Eleventh Circuit
consolidated all three appeals and held in a divided panel opinion
that the ADEA
does not abrogate the states' Eleventh Amendment
14
immunity.

salary adjustments as equitable relief).
7. Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 120 S. Ct. 631, 638 (2000) (contending that failure to
allocate funds had a disparate impact on the base pay for employees with a longer record of
service).
8. Id. at 639 (filing against the Florida Department of Corrections in the United States
District Court for the Northern District of Florida).
9. Id (seeking similar equitable relief of backpay, injunctive relief, and punitive
damages).
10. Id. at 638-39.
11. IdLat 639.
12. Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 120 S. Ct. 631, 639 (2000).
13. Id
14. Id. at 639. The Eleventh Circuit reasoned that the ADEA did not clearly indicate an
abrogation of the states' Eleventh Amendment immunity. Id. at 639. Judge Edmondson
asserted that the ADEA makes no reference to the Eleventh Amendment and states' sovereign
immunity and nowhere states "in one place, a plain statement." that individuals may maintain
suits against states in a federal court. I In his concurrence, Judge Cox did not address
Congressional intent. Id He asserted that Congress was not authorized under § 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment to abrogate the states' Eleventh Amendment immunity for the reasons
that the ADEA conferred more rights than provided by the Fourteenth Amendment, and the
Act was not enacted to remedy a ",widespread violation of the elderly's constitutional rights." IdChiefJudge Hatchett dissented on both grounds. Id.
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II. HOLDING
The United States Supreme Court held that Congress expressed a
clear intent to abrogate states' Eleventh Amendment immunity under
the ADEA, as amended. 5 However, the Court declared that Congress
was not authorized to extend coverage of the ADEA to the states;
therefore, the ADEA did not validly abrogate states' Eleventh
Amendment immunity from suit by private individuals."6
III. ANALYSIS
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve a
conflict among the Federal Courts of Appeals on the question of
whether the ADEA' 7 validly abrogates the states' Eleventh
Amendment immunity from suit by private individuals. 8 To resolve
the question, the Court looked to whether Congress expressed a clear
intent to abrogate the states' Eleventh Amendment immunity and
whether Congress had the authority to extend coverage of the Act to
the states. 19
A. ClearIntent to Abrogate States'Eleventh Amendment Immunity
The Court asserted that § 626(b) clearly provided for suits against
states by private individuals. Section 626(b) provides that the ADEA
"shall be enforced in accordance with the powers, remedies, and
procedures provided in §§ 211 (b), 216 (except for subsection (a) thereoj),
and 217 of this title, and subsection (c) of this section."2 Section
216(b) is a provision under the Fair Labor Standards Act of 19382'
("FLSA") which "authorizes employees to maintain actions for
backpay against any employer (including a public agency) in any

15. Id. at 639 (granting certiorari originally to resolve the conflict among Federal Courts of
Appeals of "whether the ADEA validly abrogates the states' Eleventh Amendment immunity").
16. Id. at 645-46 (recognizing that age is not a suspect classification under the Equal
Protection Clause and that states may discriminate "on the basis of age without offending the
Fourteenth Amendment if the age classification in question is rationally related to a legitimate
state interest").
17. See 29 U.S.C. § 623(a) (1) (1974) ("The [ADEA] makes it unlawful for an employer to
fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual or otherwise discriminate against any
individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment,
because of such individual's age."). The protected class of individuals is anyone 40 years or
older. Kime4 120 S. Ct. at 637.
18. Kimel 120 S. Ct. at 639.
19. Id. at 640 (indicating that the two issues to consider are whether Congress expressed its
intent "to abrogate that immunity, and second, if it did, whether Congress acted pursuant to a
valid grant of constitutional authority").
20. Id.

21. 88 Stat. 61, as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (1994 ed. & Supp. III).
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Federal or State court of competent jurisdiction.... 22 The Court
noted that § 203(x), defines "public agency" as including "the
government of a State or a political subdivision of a State." 21 The
Court drew the conclusion that the plain language of the
aforementioned provisions demonstrated a clear congressional intent
to subject states to suits by private individuals.24
Respondents argued that these provisions were not unmistakably
clear for two reasons: (1) an enforcement mechanism is already
contained in the ADEA under § 626(c) (1)2 and (2) the existence of
§ 626(c) (1) "renders Congress' intent to incorporate the clear
statement of abrogation in § 216(b), the FLSA's enforcement
provision, ambiguous."2 6 The Court responded .that § 626(b) "clearly
states that the ADEA 'shall be enforced in accordance with the
powers, remedies, and procedures provided in [§ 216(b)] and
subsection (c) of this section."27 The Court maintained that the
remedies provided under ADEA § 626(c) (1) and'the remedies
provided under the incorporated FLSA enforcement provision
28
(§ 216(b)), both operated in conjunction to provide relief.
Respondents' also argued that the phrase, "court of competent
jurisdiction" under FLSA § 216(b) rendered congressional intent of
abrogation unclear2s For support, Respondents cited Kennecott Copper
Corp. v. State Tax Comm'n, ° and argued that Congress intended ADEA
suits to be maintained only under circumstances in which states had
previously agreed to waive immunity."' In response, the Court
explained that in Kennecott, it found that the state statute was unclear,
in part, for the reason that it provided that taxpayers may "bring an
action in any court of competent jurisdiction." 2 The Court further
22. Kimel, 120 S. Ct. at 640.
23. Id.
24. Id. (applying the "simple but stringent test: 'Congress may abrogate the states'
constitutionally secured immunity from suit in federal court only by making its intention
unmistakably clear in the language of the statute'") (quoting Dellmuth v. Muth, 491 U.S. 223,
228 (1989)).
25. See 29 U.S.C. § 626(c) (1) (1974) ("Any person aggrieved may bring a civil action in any
court of competentjurisdiction for such legal or equitable relief as will effectuate the purposes
of this chapter.").
26.
27.
28.
29.
(1946)

Kimnz 120 S. Ct at 640-41.
Id at 641.
Id. (referehicing McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publ'g Co., 513 U.S. 352, 357 (1995)).
Id. (relying heavily on Kennecott Copper Corp. v. State Tax Comm'n, 327 U.S. 574
in which the Court disagreed).

30. 327 U.S. 573 (1946).
31. Kim4 120 S. Ct at 641.
32. 1&
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explained that under the facts of the case and the state Statute in
question, it was clear that suit may be brought in a state court but not
in a federal court 3 In contrast, the Court noted that FLSA § 216(b)
provided that employees may bring suits against states "in any Federal
or State court of competent jurisdiction." The Court asserted that
the "choice of language" is a clear indication of congressional intent
to abrogate the states' Eleventh Amendment immunity.' 5
B. CongressionalAuthority to Extend Coverage of the ADEA to the States
Relying on precedent, the Court reaffirmed that "the ADEA
constitutes a valid exercise of Congress' power to regulate
Commerce... among the several states and that the Act did not
transgress any external restraints imposed on the commerce power by
the Tenth Amendment."5 Additionally, the Court reaffirmed that
"Congress lacks power under Article 1 to abrogate the states'
sovereign immunity." s'
The Court asserted that the source of
Congress' power to abrogate states' Eleventh Amendment immunity
does not lie in the Commerce Clause; rather, it lies in the
enforcement clause of § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment and
therefore, if Congress' power to enact the ADEA rested solely on the
Commerce Clause, then the extension of the Act to the states is
impermissible3s The Court reaffirmed the principle that the states'.
sovereign immunity is constitutionally mandated. 9
1. AppropriateLegislation Under § 5 of the FourteenthAmendment
The Court asserted that Congress may remedy and deter violations
of "rights guaranteed under the [Fourteenth Amendment] by
prohibiting a somewhat broader swath of conduct, including that
which is not itself forbidden by the Amendment's text."4 However,
33. See id (authorizing employee suits against states at both federal and state levels).
34. Id
35. Id. (emphasizing that the language used in § 216(b) eliminates the ambiguity at issue
in Kennecott Copper Corp. v. State Tax Comm'n, 327 U.S. 573 (1946)).
36. Kimel v. Florida Bd.of Regents, 120 S. Ct. 631, 643 (2000).
37. I& (citing Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 72-73 (1996)).
38. See id. (explaining that under Article I, § 8, cl.3, Congress "has authority to regulate
commerce, and because the court found the ADEA valid under the Commerce Clause, it was
unnecessary to determine whether the Act could also be supported by Congress' power under
§ 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment").
39. See id. (citing the Court's decision in Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 7273 (1996), holding that Congress cannot abrogate the states' sovereign immunity under Article

I).
40. Id
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the Court cautioned that Congress' enforcement power is limited to
"the 'power to enforce,' not the power to determine what constitutes
a constitutional violation [as] [t]he ultimate interpretation and
determination of the Fourteenth Amendment's substantive meaning
remains the province of the Judicial Branch."4 The Court applied
the "congruence and proportionality" test to determine whether the
ADEA was "appropriate legislation under § 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment."42
2. Age is Not a Suspect Classification
The Court reaffirmed its prior holdings s that age is not a suspect
classification.4 Classifications based on age differ from classifications
based on race or gender in that age classifications "cannot be
characterized as 'so seldom relevant to the achievement of any
legitimate state interest.'" 45 Moreover, "[o]lder persons.., have not

been subjected to a 'history of purposeful unequal treatment' 4 6 and
"[o]ld age also does not define a discrete and insular minority" as the
status of old age is one which all persons, regardless of race or
gender, may experience. 41
3. Rational Basis Standardvs. Heightened Scrutiny Standard
The Court asserted that it is not violative of the Fourteenth
Amendment for the states to discriminate on the basis of age "if the
age classification in question is rationally related to a legitimate state
interest." 8 In contrast, the Court maintained that "[t]he substantive
requirements the ADEA imposes on state and local governments are
disproportionate to any unconstitutional conduct that conceivably
could be targeted by the Act." 9 The Court argued that the ADEA
"through its broad restriction on the use of age as a discriminating
41. Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 120 S. Ct. 631, 643 (2000).
42. Id.at 644.
43. See generally Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452 (1991); Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93
(1979); Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307 (1976) (per curiam) (finding
age classifications not violative of the Equal Protection Clause).
44. Kime 120 S. Ct. at 645 (indicating that the Court considered claims of unconstitutional
age discrimination based upon Equal Protection on three prior occasions in which it was not
persuaded (see supra text and notes accompanying note 41)).
45. Id.(quoting Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432,440 (1985)).
46. Id (citing Murgia,427 U.S. at 313 (quoting San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez,
411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973))).
47. I& (citing Murgia, 427 U.S. at 313-14).
48. Id.at 646.
49. Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 120 S. Ct. 631,645 (2000).
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factor,"° prohibit[ed] substantially more state employment decisions
and practices than would likely be held unconstitutional under the
applicable equal protection, rational basis standard."51 Petitioners
argued that the ADEA does not overreach; rather, the ADEA's
prohibitions coupled with its exceptions5 2 protected against "arbitrary
age discrimination. " 5' The Court contended that despite the
available affirmative bona fide occupational qualification defense,
under the ADEA, "the state's use of age is prima facie unlawful."
The result, the Court concluded, is such that the ADEA's substantive
requirements imposed significantly higher burdens on state
employers "at a level akin to our heightened scrutiny cases under the
Equal Protection Clause.
Petitioners also argued that the clause permitting "employers to
engage in conduct otherwise prohibited by the Act 'where the
differentiation is based on reasonable factors other than age"'
§ 623(f) (1) operated to protect against arbitrary age discrimination."
However, the Court interpreted the clause as further demonstrating
the Act's over breadth.5 7 Under the ADEA, an employer may not use
age as a proxy while "[u] rider the Constitution,... states may rely on
age as a proxy for other characteristics.""8 The Court concluded "that
Congress, through the ADEA, has effectively elevated the standard for
analyzing age discrimination to heightened scrutiny."59
4. Legislative Record
The Court's inquiry into whether the ADEA is appropriate
legislation under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, included an
examination of the legislative history behind the Acti0 The Court
50. The ADEA makes unlawful, in the employment context, all "'discriminattion] against
any individual... because of such individual's age.'" 29 U.S.C. § 623(a) (1) (1974).
51. Kime 120 S. Ct. at 647.
52. See 29 U.S.C. § 623(f) (1) (1974) (providing that employers may use age as a factor
"when it is a bona fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the normal operation
of the particular business").
53. Kime 120 S. Ct. at 647.
54. Id
55. Id, at 648.
56. See id. (confirming that protection under the ADEA exceeds the requirements of the
Equal Protection Clause, as interpreted by the Court).
57. Id. at 649 (reasoning that Congress failed to identify a pattern of age discrimination by
the states or any age discrimination warranting a constitutional violation).
58. Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 120 S. Ct. 631, 648 (2000).
59. Id.
60. See id at 648 (suggesting that "[s]trong measures appropriate to address one harm may
be an unwarranted response to another, lesser one") (citing South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383

560

JOURNAL OF GENDER, SOCIAL POLICY & THE LAW

[Vol. 8:2

maintained that Congress did not identify a history of age
discrimination by states against state employees and none which "rose
to the level of constitutional violation." 61 The Court found "that
Congress virtually had no reason to believe that state and local
governments were unconstitutionally discriminating against their
employees on the basis of age."62 The Court did not find Petitioners'
evidence of "isolated sentences clipped from floor debates and
legislative reports" persuasive.6 ' The Court concluded that the ADEA
was not appropriate legislation under § 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment and its extension to the states was invalid.6
The Court dismissed the suits and affirmed the Eleventh Circuit's
ruling.6s
IV. SEPARATE OPINIONS
A. Justice Stevens (dissentingin part, concurringin part)
Justice Stevens concurred that Congress manifested a clear intent
to subject states to suits brought by private individuals for violations
of the ADEA." He argued that "Congress' power to regulate the
American economy includes the power to regulate both the public
and the private sectors of the labor market."67 In accordance with this
power, Justice Stevens maintained that federal rules which prohibit
workplace discrimination are enforceable against both public and
private employers.'s He stated that "Congress' power to authorize
federal remedies against state agencies that violate federal statutory
obligations is coextensive with its power to impose those obligations
U.S. 301, 308 (1966)). The Court further concludes that Congress' 1974 extension of the
ADEA to the states was inappropriate for solving an inconsequential problem. I& at 648-49.
61. Id.at 649.
62. 1d&

63. Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 120 S. Ct. 631, 649 (2000) (reasoning that petitioners'
evidence did not convince the Court that states engaged in any unconstitutional age
discrimination and that evidence presented to the Court "was cobble[d] together from a
decade's worth of congressional reports").
at 650 (concluding that Congress had no reason to institute broad legislation,
64. See id.
nor did Congress have reason to believe such legislation was necessary).
65. See i&t (holding that the ADEA is not an appropriate exercise of congressional power
under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment).
66. Idat 652 n.5.
67. Idat 650.
68. Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 120 S.Ct 631, 650-51 (2000) (stating that the
applicability of federal rules outlawing workplace discrimination to public and private sector
employers is comparable to federal rules that apply to the regulation of wages, hours, or health
and safety provisions).
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on the states in the first place." 69 Justice Stevens further argued that
the Judicial Branch was not the "constitutional guardian" of state
interests." Rather, he reasoned that the Framers protected against
federal infringement of state interests by designing such structural
safeguards as "equal representation in the Senate" by each state and a
House "composed of Representatives selected by voters in the several
states." 71 Therefore, Justice Stevens surmised that "[w]henever
Congress passes a statute, it does so against the background of state
law already in place; the propriety of taking national action is thus
measured by the metric of the existing state norms that Congress
seeks to supplement or supplant."7 2 Justice Stevens reasoned that the
correct interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment is a "textual
limitation on the diversity jurisdiction of the federal courts."73 In this
case however, the court's diversity jurisdiction was not invoked and
the claims pursued arose under federal law.74 Thus, Justice Stevens
contended that the Opinion of the Court "rest[ed] entirely on a
novel judicial interpretation of the doctrine of sovereign immunity,
which the Court treats as though it were a constitutional precept."7 5
Justice Stevens concluded that Congress' power to create federal
rights coexisted with the power to enforce violations of those rights in
federal courts. 6
B. Justice Thomas (concurring in part, dissenting in part)
1. ClearStatement by Incorporation(The Sequence ofEvents Argument)
Justice Thomas explained that the ADEA, as originally enacted in
1967, incorporated by reference § 216(b), the enforcement provision
of the FLSA.7 7 However, § 216(b) did not contain a clear statement of
abrogation of states' immunity as the Court found in Employees ofDip't

69. I at 651.
70. Id. (citing Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States in the
Composition andSelection of the National Governmen 54 COLUM. L. REV. 543 (1954)).
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 120 S. Ct. 631, 652-53 (2000).
74. Id, at 655 (expressing that diversity of the parties was inconsequential, given the fact
that plaintiffs asserted claims arising out of federal law).
75. Id.
76. Id at 651 (explaining that Congress can "use its broad range of flexible legislative tools
to approach the delicate issue of how to balance local and national interests in the most
responsive and careful manner").
77. See id.at 655 (interpreting the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 and 29 U.S.C. § 216(b)
(1970)).
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of PublicHealth & Welfare ofMo. v. Departmentof PublicHealth &? Welfare
of Mo.,7" a case in which the Court was called upon to interpret this
section of the FLSA.78 In 1974, this section was modified and
included language Petitioners argued evidenced a clear statement of
abrogation.80 Justice Thomas noted that there is no mention of
ADEA § 626(b) in the legislation amending FLSA § 216(b) and
§ 6(d) (1) of the 1974 Amendments.8 ' As such, he was."unwilling to
indulge the fiction that Congress, when it amended § 216(b),
recognized the consequences for a separate Act (the ADEA) that
incorporates
the
amended
provision."8'
Justice
Thomas
acknowledged that although § 28 of the 1974 Amendments modified
select provisions of the ADEA, which implied that Congress
recognized the consequences of FLSA § 6(d) (1) on the ADEA, an
examination of the effect of FLSA § 6(d) (2) (A) on the ADEA
revealed implications to the contrary.5
LSA § 6(d) (2) (A) added
subsection (d) to FLSA statute of limitations § 255, which is
incorporated by reference in the ADEA by virtue of § 7(e) of the
ADEA. 4 However, FLSA § 255(d)-which suspended the statute of
limitations" for actions brought under § 16(b) of the FLSA---had no
application to the ADEA because the ADEA's substantive
requirements were not applicable to the states until 1974.7 As such,
prior to 1974, "there were no ADEA suits against states that could be
affected by § 255(d)'s tolling provision."ss Justice Thomas asserted
78. 411 U.S. 279 (1973).
79. Kime 120 S. Ct. at 654-55 (stating that in this case, the ADEA's substantive mandates
extended to janitors, security guards, and secretaries (among others) "in every office building
in a state's governmental hierarchy").
80. See id- (quoting and illustrating the 1974 amended version of 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) which
states in part that "an action to recover the liability prescribed in either of the preceding
sentences may be maintained against any employer (including a public agency) in any Federal
or State court of competentjurisdiction").
81. See id at 655-56 (raising issues of Congress' consideration of possible consequences the
amendment poses for the other referenced Act).
82. Id. at 656.
83. See id (criticizing that Congress "was oblivious to the impact of § 6(d) (2) (A) on the
ADEA7).
84. See Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 120 S. Ct. 631, 656 (2000) (disclosing that § 255
became part of the ADEA in 1974, yet the new § 255(d) could not have applied to the ADEA
because its substantive mandates were inapplicable prior to 1974).
85. The statute of limitations was suspended for 180 days after the effective date of the
1974 Amendments for actions brought on or before April 18, 1973. Id.
86. The FLSA suspended the statute of limitations for purposes of allowing "FLSA plaintiffs
who had been frustrated by state defendants' invocation of Eleventh Amendment immunity
under Employees to avail themselves of the newly amended § 216(b)." Id.
87. Id.
88. Id
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that if Congress was aware of this "overinclusiveness problem," it
would have amended ADEA § 626(e) to incorporate by reference
only § 255(a)-(c) in the same way it treated ADEA § 626(b), which
incorporated FLSA § 216 with exception to "subsection (a) thereof."9 ,
Justice Thomas argued this evidenced that "Congress did not clearly
focus on the impact of § 6(d) (2) (A) on the ADEA" which further
"suggest[ed] that Congress was similarly inattentive to the impact of
§ 6(d) (1)."' ° Justice Thomas concluded that the Court may at best
only infer that Congress was aware of "every last ripple those
amendments might cause in the ADEA" but the Court cannot
conclude that Congress expressed an "'unequivocal declaration'" of
abrogation.9
2. THE ADEA INCORPORATES ONLY"EXTRAS" FROM THE FLSA, NOT
OVERLAPPING PROVISIONS

Justice Thomas argued further that ADEA § 626(b) did not
incorporate FLSA § 216(b) in its entirety-specifically, the portion
creating a private right-of-action-but assuming arguendo that it did,
Justice Thomas maintained that FLSA § 216(b) was not a clear
He argued that the ADEA already
statement of abrogation.
provided for a private right-of-action in ADEA § 626(c) (1). 93 As such,
the FLSA's § 216(b) private right-of-action overlaps the ADEA's
§ 626(c) (1). 94 Justice Thomas maintained that the Court's
interpretation of these overlapping provisions as allowing individuals
to choose between the two for support of their right of action is a
"permissible inference" but not an "unequivocal declaration.., that
Congress intended to exercise its powers of abrogation. "9
Justice Thomas argued that the decision rendered in Hoffmann89. Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 120 S. Ct. 631, 656 (2000).
90. Id.

91. idat 657 (quoting Dellmuth v. Muth, 491 U.S. 223, 232 (1989)).
92. See id. (expressing the two reasons why the Court believed this was not such a case to
provide clarity to an amendment, even if doing so might sometimes provide a clear statement to
abrogate for purposes of the Act).
93. See 29 U.S.C. § 626(c) (1) (1974) ("Any person aggrieved may bring a civil action in any
court of competent jurisdiction for such legal or equitable relief as will effectuate the purposes
of this chapter."). Cf The FLSA § 216(b) provision which provides that "[a]n action to recover
the liability prescribed in either of the preceding sentences may be maintained against any
employer (including a public agency) in any Federal or State court of competent
jurisdiction...." 88 Stat. 61, as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (1994 ed. & Supp. III).
94. Kime 120 S.Ct. at 657 (arguing that "the ADEA... contains a vital element found in
both Title VII and the Fair Labor Standards Act: It grants an injured employee a right of action
to obtain the authorized relief' (quoting McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publ'g Co., 513 U.S.
352, 358 (1995))).
95. Id. at 658 (quoting Delmuth, 491 U.S. at 232).
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LaRoche Inc. v. Sperling,6 and relied upon by the Court actually lent
support to his argument that the ADEA incorporated only "extras"
from the FLSA-not overlapping provisions.17 In Hoffman-LaRoche,
the Court was presented with the issue of whether the ADEA, through
its incorporation of FLSA § 216(b), authorized the maintenance of
collective actions.98 Justice Thomas contended that the clause, "and
other employees similarly situated" was not an overlapping provision
but merely added a type of relief not already provided for in ADEA
§ 626(c) (1). 99 Furthermore, the Hoffman-LaRoche Court did not
address "§ 216(b)'s implications for the Eleventh Amendment clear
statement rule" as the Court selectively quoted the provision by
"omitting the words '(including a public agency)'" in its
interpretative analysis of the provision. 1°0 Justice Thomas argued that
the other cases'0 ' the Court relied on also did not address the
Eleventh Amendment issue and further lent support that the ADEA
incorporated only "extras" from the FLSA-not overlapping
provisions.' 2 The essence of Justice Thomas' argument is that the
exclusive private right-of-action is provided in ADEA § 626(c) (1) and
the incorporated provision of FLSA § 216(b) by virtue of ADEA
§ 626(b), operated to provide additional relief (i.e., the "extras")such as collective actions, attorney's fees, and liquidated damagesnot already provided for under the ADEA' ° 3 Justice Thomas
maintained that this, interpretation resolved the overlapping
problem.'"
Assuming arguendo that the ADEA § 626(b) did incorporate FLSA
§ 216(b) in its entirety-including the portion creating a private
right-of-action, Justice Thomas maintained that FLSA § 216(b) was
96. 493 U.S. 165 (1989).
97. Kimel 120 S. Ct. at 658 n.5 (indicating that the Hoffmann-LaRoche Court failed to
incorporate § 216(b)'s implications for the "clear statement rule" as provided by the Eleventh
Amendment due to its "selective quotations of§ 216(b)-omitting the words '(including a public
agency)'").
98. Id (citing § 216(b) of the FMSA).
99. Id (analyzing § 216(b) of the FLSA and § 626(c) (1) of the ADEA).
100. Id. at 658 n.5.
101. See McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publ'g Co., 513 U.S. 352 (1995); Lorillard v. Pons,
434 U.S. 575 (1978).
102. Kimel 120 S. Ct. at 658 n.6.
103. See id at 658 (explaining that "if § 216(b)'s private right-of-action provision were
incorporated by § 626(b) and hence available to ADEA plaintiffs, the analogous right-of-action
established by § 626(c) (1) would be wholly superfluous-an interpretive problem" which the
court refused to entertain).
104. See id. (stating that an ADEA plaintiff may choose either § 626(c) (1) or § 216(b) as the
basis for her private right-of-action, but the plausibility of this would remain a "permissible
inference").
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not a clear statement of abrogation as the provision provided that a
suit may be maintained in "any Federal or State court of competent
jurisdiction.""5 Justice Thomas argued "that a federal court is not
'competent' under the Eleventh Amendment to adjudicate a suit by a
private citizen against a State unless the State consents to the suit,"
and he supported his argument by referring to Employees where the
Court stated that "'a federal court is not competent to render judgment
against a nonconsenting State."' 1 6
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105. Id. at 659 (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (emphasis added)).
106. Id. (quoting Employees of Dep't of Public Health &Welfare of Mo. v. Department of
Public Health & Welfare of Mo., 411 U.S. 279, 284 (1973)) (emphasis added).

